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I. INTRODUCTION 
Cyberspace will become a main front in both irregular and tradi-
tional conflicts. Enemies in cyberspace will include both states 
and non-states and will range from the unsophisticated amateur 
to highly trained professional hackers. Through cyberspace, ene-
mies will target industry, academia, government, as well as the 
military in the air, land, maritime, and space domains. In much 
the same way that airpower transformed the battlefield of World 
War II, cyberspace has fractured the physical barriers that shield 
a nation from attacks on its commerce and communication.1 
One of the most prominent features of the global political system 
. . . is the significant surge in numbers and importance of non-
state entities. . . . The rise of these . . .  non-state actors and their 
growing involvement in world politics challenges the assump-
tions of traditional approaches to international relations which 
assume that states are the only important units of the interna-
tional system.2 
Within the past fifteen to twenty years, the international 
community has witnessed the rise of a new style of warfare.  
Attacks are no longer limited to soldiers firing their weapons at 
clearly defined targets on the ground, nor are they limited to 
traditional forms of air and naval operations.  Today, through 
cyberspace, enemies can target government agencies, indus-
tries, and domestic infrastructure from thousands of miles 
away.  This new form of warfare turns a state’s and non-state’s 
own technology against it in order to bring down vital infra-
structure.3  These “cyber attacks” have the potential to cause 
mass physical and economic destruction.  Their ability to be 
carried out anonymously, coupled with the low cost and wide 
availability of computers, are making cyber attacks an attrac-
tive method of warfare.4 
In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the 
                                                        
1 U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND, THE JOINT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 36 
(2010) (emphasis added).  
2 Gustaaf Geeraets, Analyzing Non-State Actors in World Politics, 1 POLE 
PAPERS, NO. 4 (1996), available at http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/pole-papers/ 
pole0104.htm. 
3 See Lesley Swanson, The Era of Cyber Warfare: Applying International 
Humanitarian Law to the 2008 Russian-Georgian Cyber Conflict, 32 L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 304 (2010).  
4 See id.  
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number of cyber attacks, both by nations and non-state actors.5  
However, currently, there are no provisions in the internation-
al laws of war that explicitly outlaw or even regulate cyber 
warfare.6  Furthermore, given the rise of the non-state actor’s 
importance and influence in the international community,7 it is 
quite odd/troubling that these international laws of war only 
apply to state actors.8 
This article argues that existing international laws of war 
are inadequate and need to be adjusted and clearly defined to 
include cyber attacks involving state and non-state actors.  
Part II of this article describes the different forms and increas-
ing use of cyber attacks in international conflicts.  Part III fo-
cuses on the importance and relevance of non-state actors in 
the international community and today’s asymmetric battle-
field.  Part IV discusses the applicability of current interna-
tional laws of war to cyber attacks.  Part V of this article sug-
gests ways in which current international law can be improved 
to include and regulate cyber attacks involving state and non-
state actors.  
II. CYBER ATTACKS AND THEIR INCREASING USE IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 
A. What is a Cyber Attack? 
 Definitions of cyber attacks vary, and the range of hostile 
activities that constitute cyber attacks are spread across a very 
wide spectrum.9  According to the U.S. Army’s Cyber Opera-
tions and Cyber Terrorism Handbook, a cyber attack is:  
The premeditated use of disruptive activities, or the threat there-
                                                        
5 Swanson, supra note 3. 
6 Id. at 305.   
7 See Geeraets, supra note 2.  
8 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (only applying the prohibition of the 
use or threat of force to state actors); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, 
Aug. 12, 1949. 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (only applying Geneva Law to 
“high contracting parties”) [hereinafter Geneva Convention for the Wounded 
and Sick]. 
9 Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the 
Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 422 (2011).   
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of, against computers and/or networks, with the intention to 
cause harm or to further social, ideological, religious, political or 
similar objectives. Or to intimidate any person in furtherance of 
such objectives.10  
More generally, Matthew Waxman defines cyber attacks as “ef-
forts to alter, disrupt, or destroy computer systems or networks 
or the information or programs on them.”11  Harm from these 
attacks can be inflicted either on a computer network, or physi-
cal facilities and persons.  Cyber attacks range from “malicious 
hacking and defacement of websites to large-scale destruction 
of the military or civilian infrastructures that rely on those 
networks.”12  
Cyber attacks are thus distinguishable from what domestic 
law enforcement has deemed “cyber crimes.”  Cyber crimes, like 
fraud or posting obscene and offensive content on the Internet, 
are governed by national criminal laws.13  The intentions of 
those that commit cyber crimes are also very different from 
those who initiate cyber attacks.14   
Cyber attacks are initiated in what is called “cyberspace.” 
Today, the most common definition for cyberspace refers to the 
internet, and usually consists of some sort of information-
sharing environment between computers.15  In the United 
States, the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Opera-
tions defines cyberspace as “a domain characterized by the use 
of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modi-
fy, and exchange data via networked systems and associated 
                                                        
10 U.S. ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND, DCSINT HANDBOOK NO. 
1.02, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE THREATS AND TERRORISM, at VII-2 (2006). 
11 Waxman, supra note 9, at 422. 
12 Id.  
13 See Natasha Solce, The Battlefield of Cyber Space: The Inevitable New 
Military Branch – The Cyber Force, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 293 (2008).   
14 See id. at 301 (explaining that those who commit cyber crimes exhibit 
personal desires like stealing money whereas a cyber attack’s purpose can be 
to take out a military target).  
15 See Michael A. Sinks, Cyber Warfare and International Law 3 (Apr. 
2008) (unpublished research paper) (on file with Air University, Air Com-
mand and Staff College), available at https://www.afresearch.org/skins 
/RIMS/display.aspx?moduleid=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-
670c0822a153&mode=user&action=researchproject&objectid=1120f215-38a9-
4829-bb7a-33de2e42ec12. 
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physical infrastructure.”16  Furthermore, “joint doctrine has 
adopted a computer-centric definition where cyberspace is the 
‘notional environment in which digitized information is com-
municated over networks.’”17  In essence, “cyberspace is the 
sum of electronic networks including, but not limited to, the In-
ternet, where various information operations occur.”18 
B. Types of Cyber Attacks 
Cyber attacks can take many shapes and forms.  This arti-
cle will focus on attacks that are used quite frequently in cy-
berspace: viruses, denial of service (DoS) attacks, distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attacks, worms, and Trojan horses. 
1. Viruses 
A virus (quite possibly the “simplest” type of cyber attack 
according to Jason Barkham) is a code fragment, intentionally 
written and launched, that attaches itself to a program, and 
only operates when the host program begins to run.19  A virus’s 
“most common trait is its ability to (1) attach itself to a host 
program and execute when the host is operated and (2) repli-
cate itself.”20  The intended goal of the virus is “to impact the 
data or integrity of the computer without the owner’s 
knowledge.”21  A well-executed and written virus has the poten-
tial to inflict serious damage.  For example, “the ‘I Love You’ 
virus, released in the spring of 2000, caused an estimated $6.7 
billion in damage.”22  
2. Denial of Service (DoS)/Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
Attacks 
In a DoS attack, an attacker, hacker, etc. seeks to prevent 
                                                        
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Swanson, supra note 3, at 307.  
19 Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and International Law on the 
Use of Force, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 57, 62-63 (2001).  
20 Sharon R. Stevens, Internet War Crimes Tribunals and Security in an 
Interconnected World, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 657, 663 (2009).  
21 Id. 
22 Barkham, supra note 19, at 62-63. 
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legitimate users from accessing information or services.23  An 
attacker will either target a computer and its network connec-
tion, or the computers and networks of sites, in order to pre-
vent the user from accessing email, websites, online accounts, 
or any other service that relies on the affected computer.24  
“The most common and obvious type of DoS attack occurs when 
an attacker ‘floods’ a network with information.”25  For exam-
ple, an individual may seek to cripple a website or a computer 
network by sending it an overwhelming amount of data re-
quests.26  Since the server can only process a certain amount of 
requests at a time, when an attacker sends an exorbitant 
amount of data requests, the server will be unable to respond 
to legitimate data requests, thus disallowing access to the 
site.27  
 Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, on the other 
hand, use many computers that “are pre-infected with a virus 
that hijacks another computer to attack Web sites, making it 
exponentially more powerful than a standard DoS attack.”28  
For instance, an attacker may take control of another computer 
or system, and then force the infected computer to send large 
amounts of data to a website.  The attack is “distributed” be-
cause the attacker is using multiple computers to launch the 
denial of service attack.29 
3. Worms 
A worm is an independent program that, once infected on 
one computer, copies itself onto other machines, but usually 
does not change the makeup of other programs.30  “Worms can 
cause damage merely by eating up network resources or by de-
                                                        
23 Mindi McDowell, National Cyber Alert System, US-CERT.GOV (Nov. 4, 
2009), http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips/ST04-015.html. 
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Wolfgang McGavran, Intended Consequences: Regulating Cyber At-
tacks, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 259, 262 (2009). 
27 McDowell, supra note 23.  
28 McGavran, supra note 26, at 262.  
29 McDowell, supra note 23. 
30 Barkham, supra note 19, at 63. 
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stroying data, and are particularly effective over networks.”31  
And, unlike a computer virus, the worm does not need to attach 
itself to an existing program.  
The first Internet worm was unleashed upon the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology’s computer network on No-
vember 2, 1988, from a twenty-three year-old Cornell Universi-
ty graduate student’s computer terminal in Ithaca, New York.32 
After infecting a single computer, the worm copied itself to oth-
er machines, and in the span of one day, infected an estimated 
five to ten percent of all Internet-connected machines at MIT.33  
4. Trojan Horses 
Derived from the “Trojan Horse” story in Greek mythology, 
Trojan horses are one of the easiest weapons that hackers can 
use to “wreak havoc on the internet.”34  A Trojan horse is a de-
structive tool that operates under the guise of a valuable or 
otherwise entertaining computer program.35  They can be vi-
ruses or remote control programs that provide complete access 
to a victim’s computer, and can be installed on a host computer 
in a number of ways, including, for instance, through an email 
attachment intended to be opened by the victim.36  As the user 
enjoys or uses the email attachment, infection occurs simulta-
neously and silently.37  In essence, a Trojan horse either replac-
es a legitimate program, or simulates a legitimate program.38  
When a user runs a Trojan horse, it executes detrimental 
commands that are unknown to the user.39  “For example, a 
Trojan horse hidden in a random program downloaded from the 
Internet may read any file on a user’s system, and then e-mail 
                                                        
31 Id.   
32 JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP 
IT 37 (2008). 
33 Id.   
34 John Crapanzano, Deconstructing SubSeven, the Trojan Horse of 
Choice, SANS INSTITUTE (2003), http://www.sans.org/reading_room/        
whitepapers/malicious/deconstructing-subseven-trojan-horse-choice_953. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
38 Kristen M. Koepsel, Methods and Tools for Cyber Attacks – Trojan 
Horse, in DATA SEC. & PRIVACY LAW § 1.44 (2011).  
39 Id. 
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it anywhere in the world.”40  Furthermore, “if a remote control 
Trojan [horse] is installed and initiated on a system, that com-
puter is now completely open to anyone who knows to connect 
to it using the Trojan horse as a server.”41  A remote control 
Trojan horse differs from a traditional computer virus in that it 
does not spread throughout an infected system; it is thus a con-
tained program designed to invisibly execute commands issued 
by a remote user.42  
C. Recent Cyber Attacks Used in International Conflicts 
Cyber attacks are not a new phenomenon in the interna-
tional community.  In 1996, a congressional report given by the 
General Accounting Office of the United States projected that 
the Department of Defense may have experienced as many as 
250,000 cyber attacks during that year, and further estimated 
that the attacks were successful 65% of the time.43  The report 
also found that only about one in 150 attacks were actually de-
tected and reported.44  These cyber attacks have evolved expo-
nentially, from small hacker attacks against government com-
puters to large-scale distributed denial of service attacks that 
can ultimately disrupt a single nation’s infrastructure, bringing 
it to its knees.  
1. Cyber Attacks on the Estonian Infrastructure 
On April 27, 2007, a massive series of cyber attacks crip-
pled main components of Estonia’s essential electronic infra-
structure.  The attacks were allegedly initiated when Estonian 
officials moved a statue commemorating Russians who per-
ished while driving the Nazis out of the country at the end of 
World War II.45  In only a few hours, the online portals of Esto-
nia’s leading banks were flooded with data requests and 
crashed.  All of the principal newspaper websites stopped work-
                                                        
40 Id.  
41 Crapanzano, supra note 34. 
42 Id. 
43 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNT. OFFICE, GAO/AIMD-96-84, COMPUTER ATTACKS AT 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSE INCREASING RISKS 2 (1996). 
44 Id. at 3. 
45 Id. 
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ing, affecting circulation, and government communications 
were largely blacked out.46  Throughout this onslaught, dozens 
of targets were assaulted across the country.47  Because of Es-
tonia’s wired “e-government,” its infrastructure was an enor-
mous target for cyber attackers.  In the end, government web-
sites, newspapers, universities, hospitals, banks, and fire and 
paramedic services were all victims of the attacks orchestrated 
by allegedly one million computers operated by third parties 
working together to bring down the Estonian government.48   
These cyber attacks ultimately lasted for weeks.49  They 
caused social unrest and rioting, resulting in property damage, 
150 people injured, and one Russian dead.50  The Estonia inci-
dent displayed the full potential of well-executed cyber attacks. 
It was the first time cyber attacks threatened the security of an 
entire nation.51 To this day, it remains unknown whether state 
or non-state actors were responsible for this offense.52  
2. The Russian-Georgian Cyber Conflict 
When war broke out between Russia and Georgia in Au-
gust 2008 over the disputed territory of South Ossetia, Russian 
bombers sought to destroy Georgia’s economic infrastructure. 
Targets included the country’s largest port on the Black Sea 
and an important road connecting southern Georgia with the 
East.53  As well, in the two months prior to the physical conflict, 
Georgia’s “Internet Infrastructure” was hit with massive DDoS 
attacks: 
[M]ajor Georgian website servers were brought down, hindering com-
munication and causing confusion throughout the country. . . . These 
cyber attacks mainly hindered the Georgian government’s ability to 
communicate with its citizens, as well as other nations, both before and 
during the physical invasion by Russia.54 
                                                        
46 Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber 
Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 192, 193 (2009).  
47 Id. 
48 Stevens, supra note 20, at 666.  
49 Id.  
50 Shackelford, supra note 46, at 193.  
51 Id.  
52 See id. at 205.   
53 Swanson, supra note 3, at 303.  
54 Id. 
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Media, communications, and transportation companies were 
also attacked, along with the National Bank of Georgia’s web-
site.55  The attacks further spread to computers throughout the 
government, even after Russian troops entered South Ossetia.56 
What is important to note about this attack is that it was the 
first time a known cyber attack had coincided with traditional 
military action.57   
3. Stuxnet 
“Stuxnet is the world’s first cyber-weapon of geopolitical 
significance; it enables a military attack using a computer pro-
gram tailored to a specific target.”58  First discovered in 2010, 
Stuxnet was a computer worm that infiltrated Siemens’s (a 
German engineering company) industrial software and equip-
ment, spreading via Microsoft Windows.59  Initiated via a re-
movable memory stick, Stuxnet was the first worm to exploit a 
Microsoft Windows vulnerability in order to spread:  
Stuxnet was the first piece of malware to exploit the Microsoft Windows 
Shortcut 'LNK/PIF' Files Automatic File Execution Vulnerability (BID 41732) in 
order to spread. The worm drops a copy of itself as well as a link to that 
copy on a removable drive. When a removable drive is attached to a sys-
tem and browsed with an application that can display icons, such as 
Windows Explorer, the link file runs the copy of the worm. Due to a de-
sign flaw in Windows, applications that can display icons can also inad-
vertently run code, and in Stuxnet’s case, code in the .lnk file points to a 
copy of the worm on the same removable drive.60  
“It then sent detailed production information through the In-
                                                        
55 John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html?_r=1&th 
=&adxnnl=1&oref=%20slogin&emc=th&adxnnlx=1218651509sGZ4ZcPX+1J8
D844weNClw. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. 
58 Holger Stark, Stuxnet Virus Opens New Era of Cyberwar, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE INTERNATIONAL (Aug. 08, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/ 
world/mossad-s-miracle-weapon-stuxnet-virus-opens-new-era-of-cyber-war-a-
778912.html. 
59 Building a Cyber Secure Plant, SIEMENS TOTALLY INTEGRATED 
AUTOMATION (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.totallyintegratedautomation.com/ 
2010/09/building-a-cyber-secure-plant/. 
60 Jarrad Shearer, W32.Stuxnet, SYMANTEC.COM (JUL. 13, 2010),  
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-071400-
3123-99.  
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ternet to a set of servers in Malaysia.”61  Stuxnet was thus able 
to provide cyber attackers with the valuable ability to remotely 
control the infection process, and to hide the existence of their 
changes to a system.62  Furthermore, the worm was not de-
signed to instantly cause damage or inconvenience, but to in-
flict destruction over a substantial period of time.63  “As long as 
the worm remained undetected, the attackers could steal in-
formation, halt production, compromise safety systems or even 
cause equipment to be damaged or people injured whenever 
they choose.”64  
Along with other countries around the world, the worm re-
peatedly targeted five industrial facilities in Iran over a ten-
month period.65  On November 23, 2010, it was announced that 
uranium enrichment at the Natanz nuclear facility had ceased 
on several occasions because of a series of severe technical 
problems caused by the Stuxnet worm.66  The worm first infect-
ed an Iranian IR-1 centrifuge, causing it to increase its operat-
ing speed for about fifteen minutes before returning to its nor-
mal frequency.67  Almost one month later, the worm went back 
into action, further slowing the infected centrifuges for a total 
of fifty minutes.68  The stresses from the shift in speeds caused 
the aluminum centrifugal tubes to expand, often forcing parts 
of the centrifuges into sufficient contact with each other, de-
stroying the machine.69  Even though destruction of the centri-
fuges was by no means total, Stuxnet displayed to the world 
the ever-growing destructive capabilities of cyber worms.  Ac-
cording to General Michael Hayden, former Director of the 
CIA, “Stuxnet is the first time where we’ve seen significant 
                                                        
61 Building a Cyber Secure Plant, supra note 59.  
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Jonathan Fildes, Stuxnet Virus Targets and Spread Revealed, BBC 
NEWS (Feb. 15, 2011, 8:51 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
12465688. 
66 Yossi Melman, Iran Pauses Uranium Enrichment at Natanz Nuclear 
Plant, HAARETZ.COM (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.haaretz.com/news 
/international/iran-pauses-uranium-enrichment-at-natanz-nuclear-plant-
1.326276. 
67 Stark, supra note 58.  
68 Id. 
69 Id.  
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physical damage created by a cyber attack.”70 
4. Alleged Government Cyber Attacks on WikiLeaks 
Hosted on various servers across the globe, the whistle-
blowing organization WikiLeaks is no stranger to cyber at-
tacks.  The organization’s founder, Julian Assange, claims that 
WikiLeak’s servers and computers are attacked in cyberspace 
on a daily basis.71  What is particularly interesting about the 
WikiLeaks cyber attacks is the alleged involvement of govern-
ment institutions.  
In 2010, WikiLeaks distributed, or “leaked,” United States 
diplomatic cables to The New York Times, revealing that Chi-
na’s Politburo directed the cyber intrusion of Google’s computer 
systems in China.72  This situation came to be known as “Ca-
bleGate.”  The Google cyber attack “was part of a coordinated 
campaign of computer sabotage carried out by government op-
eratives, private security experts and Internet outlaws recruit-
ed by the Chinese government.”73  According to Julian Assange, 
after the cables detailing the Chinese attacks on Google were 
released, the Chinese government retaliated by launching a se-
ries of DDoS attacks on WikiLeak’s servers.74  
Around the same time, armies of “zombie” computers in 
Europe, Russia, and Asia flooded the WikiLeaks servers, send-
ing massive data requests, forcing WikiLeaks to look for other 
                                                        
70 60 Minutes: Stuxnet (CBS television broadcast Mar. 4, 2012) (emphasis 
added) (transcript available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-
57390124/stuxnet-computer-worm-opens-new-era-of-warfare/). 
71 Julian Assange and How He Sees the World, SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 
(Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.scribd.com/doc/64417045/Julian-Assange-and-
How-He-Sees-the-World. 
72 Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at 
U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/ 
29/world/29cables.html.  
73 Id. This was not the first time China was involved in cyber attacks. “In 
late August 2011, a state television documentary appeared to capture an in-
progress DDoS attack by the Chinese military on a Falun Gong website based 
in Alabama. Not long after, the McAfee cyber security-company reported that 
a state actor – widely believed to be China – had been engaged in a year-long 
cyber attack program aimed at governments, U.S. corporations, and United 
Nations groups.” Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 
CALIF. L. REV. 817, 819 (2012). 
74 Julian Assange and How He Sees the World, supra note 71.  
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servers to help fight off the massive attack.75  Assange’s lawyer, 
Mark Stephens, also claimed that a “state actor” was most like-
ly behind some of these attacks.76  Even Senators and various 
officials in Washington called for the United States and hack-
ers to launch a full-scale attack on the whistleblowing organi-
zation.77  
WikiLeaks continues to be hit by massive DDoS attacks, 
making the site completely inaccessible for various periods.78  
Although the identity of the attackers is unknown, Assange 
remains steadfast in his assumption that that these attacks are 
backed by many foreign governments, including the United 
States.79  Assange has gone so far as to classify governmental 
cyber attacks on WikiLeaks as “war crimes,” by declaring 
“[a]ttacks on websites by governmental institutions however 
are a war crime, same as assaults on every other civilian infra-
structure.”80  
III. NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 
A. The Importance of Non-State Actors 
In the past, principal actors in world politics and interna-
tional relations were nation-states.81  However, in the years fol-
                                                        
75 Ashlee Vance, WikiLeaks Struggles to Stay Online After Attacks, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 03, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/world/europe/04 
domain.html.  
76 Agence France-Presse, Assange Lawyer Blames ‘State Actor’ for Cyber 
Attacks, THE RAW STORY (Dec. 03, 2010, 7:16 PM), http://www.rawstory. 
com/rs/2010/12/03/assange-lawyer-blames-state-actor-cyberattacks/.  
77 Declan McCullagh, Has WikiLeaks Landed in Cyberattack Crosshairs?, 
CNET (Oct. 27, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20020835-
38.html. 
78 WikiLeaks Site Comes Under Cyber Attack, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 
2011, 10:18 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/31/wikileaks-
site-cyberattack-cable-release. 
79 See McCullagh, supra note 77; WikiLeaks Says Website Was Target of 
Cyber Attack, REUTERS (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/ 
08/31/us-wikileaks-cyberattack-idUSTRE77U17920110831.  
80 Julian Assange and How He Sees the World, supra note 71. 
81 Muhittin Ataman, The Impact of Non-State Actors on World Politics: A 
Challenge to Nation-States, 2 ALTERNATIVES: TURKISH J. OF INT’L RELATIONS 
(2003), available at http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number1/  
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lowing World War II, there has been a proliferation of non-
state actors (“i.e. organizations lacking formal or legal status as 
a state or as an agent of a state”) in the international commu-
nity that have become principal actors in world politics and in-
ternational relations.82  The growth of non-state actors chal-
lenges and weakens the “state-centric” concept of international 
politics and replaces it with a “transnational” system, where re-
lationships and interactions are significantly more complex.83 
This phenomenon has led scholars of international relations to 
conclude that states are declining in importance, while non-
state actors are gaining great influence.84  
Today, non-state actors play an important role in foreign 
policy making and can pit one state against another.85  For ex-
ample, terrorist organizations shape entire nations’ security 
policies.  Non-governmental organizations, like WikiLeaks and 
spinoffs, open the eyes of the public to injustices, and can not 
only destroy reputations, but can drastically shape policy and 
international relations.  Moreover, these non-state actors are 
beginning to notice that cyber attacks can be a useful tool in 
accomplishing their respective goals.  
B. Cyber Attacks and Non-State Actors 
It can be argued that non-state actors are involved in cyber 
attacks almost daily.  As previously mentioned, these attacks 
can include alleged governmental attacks on non-state organi-
zations, and can range from the everyday hacker targeting gov-
ernmental websites, to sophisticated “cyber terrorists” launch-
ing massive DDoS attacks on private companies like Google.  
Terrorist organizations have also been identified as having the 
capability to launch destructive cyber attacks.  
Recently, Al Qaeda has been building its cyber skills to at-
tack Western nations.86  In 2006, it was reported that Al Qaeda 
may have called for cyber attacks against U.S. financial insti-
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86 Solce, supra note 13, at 299. 
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tutions during December of that year.87  In April 2010, court 
records from the case of terrorism suspect, Mohamedou Ould 
Slahi, revealed that the organization initiated successful cyber 
attacks, including one against government computers in Israel 
in 2001.88  “This was the first public confirmation that the ter-
rorist group has mounted an offensive cyber attack.”89  Slahi in-
formed interrogators that Al Qaeda “used the Internet to 
launch . . . computer attacks,” and that the organization “also 
sabotaged other websites by launching denial of service at-
tacks, such as one targeting the Israeli prime minister’s com-
puter server.”90  
Other international terrorist groups like the Armed Islam-
ic Group, Aum Shinrikyo, Hezbollah, and Hamas have been 
heightening their computer expertise as well.91 “Furthermore, 
four domestic [U.S.] terrorist organizations – Hammerskin Na-
tion, Stormfront, Aryan Nation, and National Alliance – are 
recognized as potentially having the technology to engage in 
cyber terrorism.”92  British authorities are also bracing for an 
increase in cyber attacks as a result of Al Qaeda calling for a 
cyber jihad following the death of Osama bin Laden.93  
There will be more cyber terrorism. Groups will continue to bene-
fit from the off-the-shelf technology in planning and conducting 
attacks, making operations more secure and potentially more le-
thal. The Internet and virtual space will be strategically vital.94  
However, even though non-state actors are extremely im-
portant in international relations and have the capability to 
launch destructive cyber attacks, attacks involving these par-
                                                        
87 Id.  
88 Alex Kingsbury, Documents Reveal Al Qaeda Cyberattacks, U.S. NEWS 
(Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/04/14/documents-
reveal-al-qaeda-cyberattacks.  
89 Id.  
90 Id.  
91 Solce, supra note 13, at 299.  
92 Id.   
93 Gerry Smith, UK Authorities Brace for ‘Cyber Jihad’ By Al Qeada after 
Bin Laden Death, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 12, 2011, 1:17 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/12/al-qaeda-cyber-
jihad_n_895579.html. 
94 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP’T, CONTEST: THE UNITED 
KINGDOM’S STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM, 2011, Cm 8123, at 41 
(U.K.). 
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ties are not governed by current international laws.  
By definition, terrorists who engage in the interstate use of force 
do not observe the laws of war. Therefore, they are not entitled to 
an elevated status that would grant them protections under jus 
in bello. As such, members of terror groups are entitled to fewer 
rights than protected persons and lawful combatants.95  
These existing rules have little to say, if anything at all, about 
non-state actors that will most likely be at the center of these 
future cyber conflicts.96 
IV. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAWS OF WAR AND 
CYBER ATTACKS 
The laws of war are split into two principle divisions: jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello. Jus ad bellum, or the “law to war,” 
“governs the legality of resorting to armed force,”97 whereas jus 
in bello means the “law in war.”98  For purposes of jus ad bel-
lum, when analyzing whether an international conflict, cyber 
or otherwise, is governed by the international laws of war, it 
must be determined whether the attack violates the United 
Nations Charter.99  In other words, does the attack constitute a 
level of force that is prohibited by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Char-
ter?100  Or, does the attack rise to the level of an armed attack 
justifying self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter?101  
If the attack satisfies the principles of jus ad bellum, and can 
be viewed as an armed attack under the U.N. Charter, then we 
must look to laws governing the conduct of war.  Such laws are 
known as jus in bello laws, which are comprised of both Geneva 
and Hague law.102 
                                                        
95 Norman G. Printer, Jr., The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors 
Under International Law: An Analysis of the U.S. Predator Strike in Yemen, 8 
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 331, 334 (2003).  
96 See Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for In-
formation Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1093 (2007).  
97 Swanson, supra note 3, at 312 
98 Id. 
99 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; art. 51.   
100See Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. 
REV. 817, 841 (2012). 
101 Id. at 845.  
102 U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT 3 (2004) [hereinafter JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF 
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A. Jus ad Bellum 
Legal regulation of the use of force in the international 
community begins with Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.103  The 
provision states that “[a]ll members shall refrain in their in-
ternational relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.”104  However, the meaning of the “use of force” has 
been debated ever since the Charter went into effect.105  
Many view “use of force” to be interpreted in three possible 
ways: force as armed violence, force as coercion, and force as in-
terference.106  Advocates of the “force as armed violence view” 
argue that “use of force” strictly applies to military attacks or 
armed violence.107  This view mainly analyzes the instrument 
used to inflict force, rather than its general effect.108  Under the 
“force as coercion” interpretation, force is viewed in a more ex-
pansive way.109  Proponents of this interpretation view force as 
including forms of pressure other than just armed force, i.e. po-
litical and economic coercion threatening state autonomy.110  
The third approach, or “force as interference” approach, “ties 
the concept of force to improper interference with the rights of 
other states, focusing on the object and specific character of a 
state’s actions rather than a narrow set of means or their coer-
cive effect.”111  Weaker nation states and some scholars defend 
the “force as coercion” and “force as interference” views.112  
However, the general consensus, and the dominant view in the 
international community, is that Article 2(4) prohibits only 
physical armed force.113  
                                                                                                                            
ARMED CONFLICT]. 
103 Waxman, supra note 9, at 426. 
104 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
105 Waxman, supra note 9, at 427-29.  
106 Id. at 427-30.  
107 Id. at 427-28. 
108 Id. at 428. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 428-29. 
111 Id. at 429.  
112 See id. at 429-30. 
113 Hathaway, supra note 100, at 842. 
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One exception to the blanket rule of Article 2(4) prohibiting 
the threat or use of armed force is articulated in Article 51 of 
the U.N. Charter.  Article 51 stands for the proposition that na-
tions can use force as a means of self-defense: “[n]othing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.”114  Lawful self-defense is very difficult to define.115 
However, the critical question in determining the lawfulness of 
self-defense is whether or not an “armed attack” has actually 
occurred.116  
It is also widely understood that the definition of “armed 
attack” is much narrower than the definition of “force” under 
the U.N. Charter.117  For example, there may be acts that vio-
late Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use or threat of force, but 
do not constitute an “armed attack.” In Nicaragua v. The Unit-
ed States, the International Criminal Court (ICJ) found that  
[A]n armed attack must be understood as including not merely 
action by regular armed forces across an international border, 
but also "the sending by . . . a State of armed bands . . . which 
carry out acts of armed force against another State. . . .” The 
Court sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibi-
tion of armed attacks may apply to the sending by a State of 
armed bands to the territory of another State to the territory of 
another State, if such an operation, because of its scale and ef-
fects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than 
as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular 
armed forces.118  
According to the ICJ, armed attacks are those that constitute 
the “most grave forms of the use of force.”119  
                                                        
114 U.N. Charter art. 51.   
115 Hathaway, supra note 100, at 844.   
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103 (June 27) (emphasis added) (quoting Article 3, 
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1. Application of Jus ad Bellum to Cyber Attacks 
In order for the U.N. Charter to apply to cyber attacks, the 
attacker must be a nation-state.120  If a situation existed where 
a non-state actor (i.e. a terrorist organization) launched a cyber 
attack against a state actor (and vice-versa), the Charter would 
not apply.  Since there are no specific provisions in the U.N. 
Charter addressing cyber attacks, scholars have looked to 
many approaches in interpreting the Charter in order to pin-
point when a cyber attack constitutes a use or threat of force, 
or when they rise to the level of an armed attack.  
Duncan Hollis utilizes three approaches in order to deter-
mine when a cyber attack constitutes a use or threat of force 
under Article 2(4).121  However, according to Hollis, there are 
major problems with each approach used in a modern con-
text.122  The first approach is the traditionalist “instrumentali-
ty” approach, which argues that a cyber attack cannot consti-
tute an “armed attack” under Article 2(4) because it lacks the 
physical characteristics traditionally associated with a military 
attack.123  According to Hollis, the text of the U.N. Charter of-
fers some support for this view in Article 41, which “lists 
‘measures not involving the use of armed force’ to include ‘com-
plete or partial interruption of . . . telegraphic, radio, and other 
means of communication.”124  Since the object of most cyber at-
tacks is to interrupt or disrupt some means of communication 
(i.e. a massive DDoS attack aimed at a website in order to stop 
it from displaying information), “more or different forms of ag-
gression must be shown in order [for the cyber attack] to con-
stitute an ‘armed attack’ under the U.N. charter.”125  
The second approach, the “target-based” approach,126 sug-
gests that cyber attacks constitute a use of force or an armed 
attack whenever the attack “penetrates ‘critical national infra-
structure’ systems, even absent significant destruction or casu-
                                                        
120 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; art. 51.   
121 Hollis, supra note 96, at 1041.  
122 Id. at 1041-42.  
123 Id. at 1041. 
124 Id. 
125 Stevens, supra note 20, at 675. 
126 Hollis, supra note 96, at 1041.  
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alties.”127  Hollis argues that this approach tends to be too over-
inclusive, since cyber attacks can produce wide-ranging effects, 
from merely informational (distributing propaganda), to incon-
venient (disrupting systems temporarily via a denial-of-service 
attack), to potentially dangerous (implanting a logic bomb do-
ing no immediate harm, but with the potential to cause future 
injury), to immediately destructive (disabling a system perma-
nently via a virus).128 
The third and final approach, the “consequentiality” ap-
proach, focuses on the consequences of the cyber attack.129  
Whenever the cyber attack intends to cause effects normally 
produced by kinetic force (death and destruction of property), 
the attack constitutes a use of force, and an armed attack.130  
Sharon Stevens argues that the real problem with the “conse-
quentiality” approach is that it does not account for the damage 
a cyber attack can inflict even with a lack of physical effects: 
A cyber attack that shuts down any part of a nation’s critical in-
frastructure may have an effect that is much more debilitating 
than a traditional military attack. The threat in such a situation 
may be more terrorizing and harmful than a traditional armed 
attack. Certainly, a country that is unable to use its banking sys-
tem, or whose power grid has gone off-line due to a cyber attack, 
possesses legitimate claims for reparation, justice, and security. 
Because the consequentiality approach focuses on the same type 
of physical damage caused by a kinetic attack, it does not suffi-
ciently protect critical infrastructure.131  
But, given these possible approaches, is it possible that the 
current law of jus ad bellum could apply to the recent cyber at-
tacks mentioned in Part II of this article? 
3. Current Jus ad Bellum Laws are Inadequate in Regulating 
Recent Cyber Attacks 
Since cyber attacks lack the physical characteristics of a 
traditional military attack, the “instrumentality” approach would not 
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apply to the cyber attacks on Estonia’s infrastructure, the Russia-
Georgian conflict, the Stuxnet worm, the alleged governmental attacks 
on WikiLeaks, the Chinese cyber attacks, and cyber attacks involving 
terrorists.  As a result, these attacks would not constitute force or an 
armed attack under the U.N. Charter.  
With regards to the “target-based” approach, it may be 
possible that current jus ad bellum laws apply to the Estonian 
cyber attacks, but not the Russian-Georgian conflict, or the 
Stuxnet worm.  As previously stated, Estonia’s infrastructure 
was under a massive DDoS attack in 2007.  Fire services, hos-
pitals, newspapers, and banks were all victims of the attack.  It 
can be argued that Estonia’s critical infrastructure was at-
tacked, and under the “target-based” approach, this attack 
could be seen as a use or threat of force, or an armed attack.  
However, since the attack caused mere confusion and unrest 
rather than any direct deaths or destruction of property, is it 
reasonable that these cyber attacks be labeled as a use of force 
or an armed attack under the U.N. Charter?  The current laws 
of force and armed attack do not specify or answer this ques-
tion.  
In applying the “target-based” approach to the Russia-
Georgian cyber attack and the Stuxnet worm, one needs to ex-
amine what constitutes “critical national infrastructure,” since 
it is unclear whether government websites actually constitute 
“critical national infrastructure.”  One could argue that gov-
ernment websites that affect a nation’s ability to communicate 
are part of its “critical national infrastructure.”  However, the 
current law does not incorporate this definition.  Also, what 
about cyber attacks against nuclear facilities, as in the case of 
the Stuxnet worm?  Do these facilities constitute “critical na-
tional infrastructure” under Hollis’s “target-based” approach? 
Again, one can only speculate. 
In all of the cyber attacks mentioned, with the exception of 
the Estonian situation, there were no civilian casualties.  
Nonetheless, in all of these cases, it can be argued that there 
was a destruction of property.  In the case of the Stuxnet worm, 
parts of nuclear centrifuges in Iran were destroyed.  Regarding 
Estonia, Russia, and the WikiLeaks DDoS attacks, it can be in-
ferred that massive amounts of data were likely destroyed as a 
result of the cyber attacks.  However, it is unlikely that this 
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type of property destruction would amount to a use of force or 
an armed attack under a formalist analysis of the U.N. Char-
ter, given the fact that the Charter was written decades ago.  
As a result, it is unlikely that the “consequences” approach 
would apply to any of the cyber cases cited.  
Lastly, since cyber attacks involving WikiLeaks and terror-
ists involve non-state actors, current jus ad bellum laws would 
not apply in these situations, no matter what approach is used 
or how much damage is inflicted.  However, “in today’s world, 
non-state actors may inflict damages tantamount to a state-
sponsored military attack.  Non-state aggressors may also gain 
sophisticated technological skills that parallel the type of at-
tack that Estonia faced in 2007.”132  
It is clear to see that the current jus ad bellum laws ac-
complish little in categorizing recent cyber attacks as a use or 
threat of force or an armed attack.  However, the cases men-
tioned demonstrate major flaws in current jus ad bellum laws, 
and demonstrate that current laws must adapt to this new 
style of combat.  
B. Jus in Bello (International Humanitarian Law) 
As previously stated, jus in bello or “law in war,” also 
known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or the Law of 
Armed Conflict (LOAC), is a set of rules that seek to limit the 
effects of armed conflicts.133  IHL also “protects persons who are 
not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts 
the means and methods of warfare.”134  
IHL is comprised of both Geneva and Hague law.135  Gene-
va law refers to the laws created in the Geneva Conventions.136  
A major part of IHL is contained in the four Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949,137 which nearly every nation-State in the world 
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133 What is International Humanitarian Law?, INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE 
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has agreed to be bound by.138  The Conventions have been fur-
ther developed and supplemented by two agreements know as 
the Additional Protocols I and II of 1977, which relate to the 
protection of victims of armed conflicts.139  “These treaties are 
particularly concerned with the protection of the victims of 
armed conflict, with Additional Protocol I focusing on the 
means and methods of warfare.”140  Conversely, Hague law re-
fers to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, and is mainly 
concerned with the methods and means of warfare, tactics and 
the general conduct of hostilities.141  
In order for IHL to govern a cyber attack, the attack must 
constitute an “armed conflict.”142  According to the Internation-
al Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), there are only two types 
of armed conflicts under IHL: “[i]nternational armed conflicts, 
opposing two or more States, and non-international armed con-
flicts between governmental forces and non-governmental 
armed groups, or between such groups only.”143  Regarding in-
ternational armed conflicts (IAC), Common Article 2 of the Ge-
neva Conventions provides that: 
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in 
peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of de-
clared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise be-
tween two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the 
state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention 
shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the 
territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation 
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meets with no armed resistance.144 
Additional Protocol I also relies on this same “armed conflict” 
language.  Article 1(3) of Additional Protocol I states “this Pro-
tocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 for the protection of war victims, shall apply in the situa-
tions referred to in Article 2 common to those Conventions.”145  
In the words of the Conventions, “High Contracting Parties” 
are nation-States.146  The Commentary of the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949 also states:  
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the in-
tervention of armed forces is an armed conflict within the mean-
ing of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a 
state of war. It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or 
how much slaughter takes place.147  
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via (ICTY) in The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic further defined an 
IAC by holding that “an armed conflict exists whenever there is 
a resort to armed force between States.”148  
In defining non-international armed conflicts, it is appro-
priate to consult Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions 
and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol II.149  Additionally, the 
ICTY determined the existence of a non-international armed 
conflict “whenever there is . . . protracted armed violence be-
tween governmental authorities and organized armed groups 
or between such groups within a State.”150  The court further 
confirmed that NIAC’s exist in situations where “several fac-
tors [confront] each other without involvement of the govern-
ment’s armed forces.”151  Since the ruling in Tadic, each judg-
ment of the ICTY has taken this definition as a starting 
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point.152 
1. Application of Current IHL to Cyber Attacks 
Assuming a cyber attack does meet the definition of force 
and armed attack under the U.N. Charter, the next step in the 
analysis would be to determine if the attack is governed by cur-
rent jus in bello principles or International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL).  As previously stated, in order for IHL to govern a cyber 
attack, an armed conflict must exist.  Some have argued that 
IHL cannot govern cyber attacks because there is nothing 
physical or kinetic about these operations.153  Under this theo-
ry, a cyber attack is not an armed conflict because it does not 
embody traditional aspects of military attacks; therefore, cyber 
attacks are beyond the scope of current IHL. 
However, commentaries to the Geneva Conventions and 
the Additional Protocols have implied that “armed conflict” can 
be viewed in an expansive way.154  “[S]ome degree of intensity 
and duration must be considered, as underlying principles of 
IHL make clear.”155  IHL contained in Hague Law and the Ge-
neva Conventions is based on the idea that victims of an armed 
conflict are entitled to protection.156  This protection is usually 
framed in terms of injury, death, or property damage or de-
struction.157  “Therefore, fundamental principles of IHL provide 
that armed conflict occurs when a group takes measures that 
injure, kill, damage, or destroy.”158  
As a result, a cyber attack could constitute an armed con-
flict, as long as certain consequences result from the attack.  
Moreover, the language of Additional Protocol I indicates that 
the drafters anticipated change, and that Geneva law would 
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have to apply to new methods of warfare.159  Article 36 of Addi-
tional Protocol I requires that: 
In the study, development, acquisition, or adoption of a new 
weapon, means or methods of warfare, a High Contracting Party 
is under an obligation to determine whether its employment 
would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Proto-
col or by any other rule of international law applicable to the 
High Contracting Party.160   
IHL can also be viewed as anticipating technological change.161  
The “Martens Clause” in the Preamble to the Hague Conven-
tion IV of 1907 provides:  
[E]ven in cases not explicitly covered by specific agreements, ci-
vilians and combatants remain under the protection and authori-
ty of principles of  international law derived from established cus-
tom, principles of humanity, and from the dictates of public 
conscience.”162  
In other words, attacks should essentially be judged largely by 
their effects, rather than by how they are employed.163  
When applying IHL to cyber attacks, the attack must fol-
low some guidelines.  For instance, the attack must not produce 
“unnecessary suffering.”164  Article 35 of Additional Protocol I 
thus serves to place some limits on the range of means and 
weapons that are available in today’s modern society.  The at-
tack must also follow the principle of proportionality as stated 
in Additional Protocol I, which requires that the losses result-
ing from the attack should not be excessive in relation to the 
expected military advantage.165  “These principles are im-
portant to cyber [attacks] because they require that the attack-
er refrain from attacks that may be expected to cause excessive 
collateral damage.”166  
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Where armed conflict exists, IHL governs once kinetic 
weapons are used in combination with cyber attacks.167  How-
ever, the law is unclear when cyber attacks are the first or only 
hostile attacks in the conflict.  Yet, it is agreed that in this sit-
uation, the key to assessing the attack is in analyzing the ef-
fects or consequences of the attack.168  “Based on this frame-
work, IHL applies whenever cyber attacks, attributed to a state 
are more than simply sporadic in nature and are intended to, 
and actually do, cause injury, death, damage, or destruction or 
such consequences are foreseeable.”169  Therefore, IHL most 
likely would not apply to cyber attacks where the actual, fore-
seeable, or intended consequences do not include injury, death, 
damage, or destruction.170  However, a lone cyber attack might 
fall under current IHL if these consequences would result.171  
2. Current IHL is Inadequate in Regulating Recent Cyber 
Attacks 
In applying current IHL to recent cyber attacks - i.e. the 
attacks on Estonia’s infrastructure, the Russian-Georgian conflict, the 
Stuxnet worm, the alleged governmental attacks on WikiLeaks, and Chi-
nese cyber attacks - one may conclude that these conflicts did not result 
in the kinds of consequences necessary to rise to the level of an armed 
conflict under current IHL.  During the cyber conflict between Russia 
and Georgia, major servers were brought down, resulting in confusion 
throughout the country and hindering certain communications.  In Esto-
nia, the nation’s infrastructure was hit, affecting many key societal com-
ponents.  The same could be said for the WikiLeaks attacks and the 
Stuxnet worm.  An argument could be made that damage or destruction 
was done to property in these situations, even if death or injury were not 
present.  Yet, since it appears that the main results of these cyber attacks 
were confusion, inconvenience, and possible data destruction, IHL would 
not govern these situations. 
Nevertheless, while the cyber attacks resulting in the 
types of consequences discussed above were implemented by 
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non-state actors, which are not covered by current IHL, they do 
pose serious problems, and can be potentially harmful in many 
indirect ways.  Consider the outcomes if the governmental at-
tacks on WikiLeaks or the Chinese cyber attacks caused mas-
sive data destruction or massive property destruction to com-
puters or servers; or if Al Qaeda launched a massive cyber 
attack against the United States military or the United States 
infrastructure, causing a major dam to be destroyed, resulting 
in widespread flooding.  Or, suppose a third party was behind 
the Stuxnet worm, or the Estonia or Russian-Georgian conflict.  
Assuming these cyber attacks did produce the necessary conse-
quences to make IHL applicable, IHL still would not apply be-
cause it only applies to states or “High Contracting Parties.”  
Though, as non-state actors have the potential to cause mas-
sive destruction via a cyber attack, the laws must address 
them.  
V. IMPROVING CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 A. International Laws vs. Domestic Criminal Laws 
Before discussing ways in which to expand or amend cur-
rent international laws to include cyber attacks between state 
and non-state actors, it must be determined whether interna-
tional laws are in fact the most effective tool in regulating 
cyber attacks between state and non-state actors.  Perhaps 
separate domestic laws might better serve this purpose?  Alt-
hough some may believe domestic laws are the best means to 
address the cyber attack issue, given the nature of cyber at-
tacks, the confusion and lack of clarity created by conflicting 
domestic laws and policies, and the global trend of nations com-
ing together to form multilateral agreements regarding similar 
areas of cyberspace, utilizing international laws seems to be 
the best solution.   
Cyber attacks are global in nature.172  Changes in domestic 
law and policy criminalizing cyber attacks, while valuable legal 
responses, cannot adequately and effectively curb an action 
that is truly an international concept.173  Cyber attacks occur in 
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cyberspace, and “cyberspace is a network of networks that in-
cludes thousands of Internet service providers across the globe: 
no single state or organization can maintain effective cyber de-
fenses on its own.”174  “An effective solution to this global chal-
lenge cannot be achieved by individual states acting alone.  It 
will require global cooperation.”175  
International laws further establish uniformity and clarity 
where numerous domestic laws may not.  Many countries, in-
cluding the United States and China, have recognized the seri-
ous threat posed by cyber attacks.176  In 2011, the Department 
of Defense established “five strategic initiatives” to cyber secu-
rity.177  The Pentagon further stated that a cyber attack by a 
foreign state could be considered a traditional act of war, in 
that “any computer attack that threatens widespread civilian 
casualties – for example, by cutting off power supplies or bring-
ing down hospitals and emergency-responder networks – could 
be treated as an act of aggression.”178  However, the Pentagon’s 
policy fails to mention how the United States might respond to 
a cyber attack from a non-state actor,179 “nor does it establish a 
threshold for what level of cyber attack merits a military re-
sponse.”180 
China, on the other hand, seems to take a more expansive 
approach to cyber attacks.  The Shanghai Cooperation Organi-
zation, a security cooperation group headed by China and Rus-
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sia, adopted more of a means-based approach to cyber at-
tacks.181  The agreement between the parties cites and defines 
an “information war” (basically a “cyber war”) as “mass psycho-
logic [sic] brainwashing to destabilize society and state, as to 
force the state to take decisions in the interest of an opposing 
party.”182  The agreement further states that the “dissemina-
tion of information harmful to the spiritual, moral, and cultural 
spheres of other states” should be viewed as a “security 
threat.”183   
These policies initiated by the United States and China 
obviously lack clarity and uniformity.  An attack initiated 
against China may not be considered a cyber attack under 
United States policies, but may be deemed one under Chinese 
cyber attack principles.  A singular cyber attack definition un-
der international law, such as the U.N. Charter, can accom-
plish uniformity as well as clarity, and therefore makes inter-
national law the more effective tool for regulating cyber 
attacks.  
In recent years, there has been somewhat of a trend to-
wards countries signing multilateral agreements in order to es-
tablish uniform laws regarding cyberspace and cyber crimes.  
One such agreement, besides the Shanghai Cooperation Organ-
ization, is the Convention on Cybercrime.  The Convention was 
adopted in 2001 by the Council of Europe.184  Since its adoption, 
forty-three countries have signed the treaty, but only sixteen 
have ratified it.185  The Convention’s main objective is to pursue 
a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society 
against cybercrime, especially by adopting appropriate legisla-
tion and fostering international cooperation.186  In other words, 
the basic purpose of the Convention was to create a vehicle that 
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would facilitate the creation of uniform domestic laws relating 
to Internet crime.187    
The interest in harmonizing cyber laws stemmed from the chaot-
ic and impossible dilemma presented to anyone intending to do 
international business via the Internet. The web of varied and 
conflicting criminal sanctions was overwhelming and burden-
some. Not only was it difficult to understand what law applied to 
a given situation, but even if one could manage that feat, in order 
to act lawfully, that actor would have to sink to the lowest com-
mon denominator, i.e., to follow the most restrictive law in the 
world. This situation was unfair and too restrictive on the Inter-
net itself.188 
In creating the Convention, the drafters understood that the 
only way to effectively regulate cyberspace is through a multi-
lateral set of uniform laws.189  The drafters recognized it was 
simply too difficult to accomplish this goal any other way.190  
B. Amendments and Expansion Suggestions  
1. Inclusion of Non-State Actors 
First, and arguably most importantly, international laws 
like the U.N. Charter and the Geneva Conventions must be 
amended to include conflicts involving non-state actors. Alt-
hough non-state actors are not traditionally subject to jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello principles, the current international le-
gal construct needs to evolve in order to include these principle 
actors.191  In regards to the U.N. Charter, Norman Printer de-
scribes two reasons why non-state actors should not escape the 
Charter’s provisions: 
First, an entity that elects to use force on the international plane 
should be treated as an international actor and should be bound 
by accepted international norms . . . . Second, it would be incon-
sistent with the purpose of the Charter to allow terrorist groups 
that engage in transnational armed conflict against a state to fall 
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outside the Charter.192 
In order for non-state actors to be covered under these 
laws, they would need to be granted some sort of international 
legal status.193  Printer suggests that although non-state actors 
do not typically enjoy international legal status, actors like 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have increasingly be-
come recognized as subjects of international law “with some in-
cidents of international legal status.”194  Printer further argues, 
“a terrorist network that operates on a global basis, insofar as 
it is an association of persons with a common purpose not affil-
iated with a state, arguably attributes similar to an NGO.”195  
Yet, Printer suggests that terrorist groups should not enjoy the 
same legitimacy as an NGO.196  Instead, terrorist groups should 
receive a limited form of international legal status, focusing on 
the rights of states in the international community to hold such 
organizations accountable for violations of international laws of 
force.197 
In addition, if the principles of jus ad bellum outlined in 
the U.N. Charter were applied to non-state actors, the purpose 
of the Charter to maintain international peace and security 
would be furthered.198  Conversely, the Charter’s principles 
would be ill-served if the activities of rogue groups fell outside 
the principles of jus ad bellum, since non-state actors such as 
terrorist organizations have the capacity to greatly threaten in-
ternational peace and security.199  
A similar argument can be made that jus in bello princi-
ples, outlined in the Geneva Conventions, should apply to non-
state actors.  Since the purpose of the Conventions and its Ad-
ditional Protocols is to limit the effects of armed conflicts and 
conduct of actors within these armed conflicts, the principles of 
jus in bello would be ill-served if non-state actors were not in-
cluded, as their conduct would not be limited in any way.  Fur-
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thermore, conduct of state actors involved in conflicts with non-
state actors would be murky and unclear. 
2. A Clear Cyber Attack Definition 
As previously stated, currently a cyber attack can be de-
fined in many ways.  Accordingly, a specific, codified definition is 
needed.  A singular definition would provide clarity on whether a state or 
non-state actor is initiating an armed conflict and whether retaliation in 
self-defense is warranted.
200
  Specific codification of international crimi-
nal provisions for cyber attacks also creates greater deterrence because 
actors know what is specifically forbidden.
201
  The legitimacy gained by 
cyber attack codification increases cyber attack law’s deterrence value 
since actors are more likely to follow rules and regulations that carry the 
authority of legitimacy.
202
  As a result, the U.N. Charter should be 
amended to include a clear and comprehensive definition of cyber at-
tacks.  
Davis Brown proposed a singular definition of a cyber at-
tack – calling it an information attack - in his “Draft Conven-
tion Regulating the Use of Information Systems in Armed Con-
flict”: 
The term “information attack” means the use of computer and/or 
other information or communications systems to destroy, alter, or 
manipulate data or images, engage in denial of service attacks, 
transmit malicious code, or perpetrate similar attacks, or do 
physical damage to any target for the purpose of inflicting injury 
or degrading the enemy’s ability or will to fight.203  
Brown’s definition is a good starting point.  However, the pro-
posed amendment should define the various types of cyber at-
tacks, while at the same time should be broad enough to incor-
porate the idea that new methods of cyber attacks are likely to 
be discovered. 
                                                        
200 Hathaway, supra note 100, at 881-82. 
201 Stevens, supra note 20, at 704. 
202 Id. 704-05.  
203 Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate 
the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 179, 
215 (2006).  
2013] INT’L LAWS OF WAR AND CYBER ATTACKS 311 
 
3. Cyber Attacks as a Use of Force 
Since the general consensus in the international communi-
ty is that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits only physical 
armed force,
204
 the U.N. Charter must be changed to clearly indicate 
when a cyber attack would be a use of force.  In expanding the U.N. 
Charter, cyber attacks should be considered an act of force by a state or a 
non-state actor based on a “consequentiality” approach described in Part 
IV of this article, regardless of the instrumentality used or the type of ac-
tor.
205
  This definition would further include damage that cyber attacks 
can inflict, even with a lack of physical effects.  A recent publication 
from the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel, agrees that 
the consequences of a cyber attack are extremely important: 
If a coordinated computer network attack shuts down a nation’s 
air traffic control system along with its banking and financial 
systems and public utilities, and opens the floodgates of several 
dams resulting in general flooding that causes widespread civil-
ian deaths and property damage, it may well be that no one 
would challenge the victim nation if it concluded that it was a 
victim of an armed attack, or of an act equivalent to an armed at-
tack.206  
So, if there is a certain level of death and property destruction 
caused by the cyber attack, this attack should be viewed as an 
act of force under the U.N. Charter.  Regarding property de-
struction, the threshold should ultimately include the type of 
traditional physical destruction produced by kinetic force 
(building collapse, bomb detonations, destruction caused by 
flooding, etc.), as well as some substantial threshold level of da-
ta destruction, to ensure attacks that target and affect a na-
tion’s infrastructure (i.e. banking systems, emergency re-
sponse, and power grids) are covered.  
This “consequentiality” approach should also address the 
type of cyber attacks that lack traditional physical effects.  For 
instance, the U.N. Charter definition of force should include 
cyber attacks whose consequences are economic and political, 
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instead of applying only in situations where there are foreseea-
ble or intended consequences from the attacks including injury, 
death, damage, and destruction.207  Sharon Stevens argues 
“cyber attacks which result in economic losses or inconvenience 
to civilians . . . could be used by an enemy country to target cer-
tain ethnic groups, gain economic advantage in international 
trade, or influence international exchange rates.”208  These 
types of attacks could cause massive destruction, albeit not 
physical.  As a result, attacks similar to the DDoS attacks that 
briefly shut down Estonia’s infrastructure in 2007, as well as 
those relating to the Russian-Georgian Cyber Conflict, could 
arguably fall within this category.  Furthermore, these types of 
attacks can be potentially more debilitating than a traditional 
military attack.  Given these guidelines, a cyber attack that on-
ly affected free speech would not be included in this definition 
of force, nor would an attack that only destroyed a small net-
work of electronic data.  Consequently, cyber attacks like the 
Stuxnet worm, which caused minimal property and data de-
struction, would probably not fall under this proposed expand-
ed definition of the use of force.  Lastly, cyber attacks that 
simply cause confusion among the populace, or amongst the 
non-state actors’ members, would not specifically be covered by 
the Charter as an act of force.  This expanded definition of force 
would apply equally to state and non-state actors.  
Targets should also be more clearly defined.  For instance, 
instead of utilizing the term “critical national infrastructure,” 
perhaps the Charter should include a definition of the term 
“critical infrastructure” so as to ensure that non-state actors 
are covered, since their infrastructure is not in a sense “nation-
al.”  The definition should include power grids, banking sys-
tems, water supply systems, nuclear facilities, etc.  Attacks 
against critical infrastructure would thus be an act of force un-
der Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter if certain consequences oc-
curred.  The term “critical infrastructure” should not only mean 
the actual physical infrastructure, but also websites or comput-
er systems of these agencies or non-state actors, so as to ensure 
that potentially vulnerable computer networks are protected.  
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4. Cyber Attacks in IHL 
Since IHL can only govern attacks that rise to the level of 
an armed conflict as defined in the Geneva Conventions and its 
Additional Protocols, and since it is questionable whether cyber 
attacks can ever be governed by existing IHL principles, the 
definition of armed conflict under IHL needs to be expanded to 
include cyber attacks involving state and non-state actors.  
Since the law of armed conflict outlined in IHL mainly focuses 
on the effects of an armed attack or use of force, or when an at-
tack causes “injury, death, damage, or destruction, or when 
such consequences are foreseeable,”209 the definition of armed 
conflict should be expanded to include cyber attacks between 
states and non-states that exhibit these type of consequences, 
as well as political and economic consequences previously dis-
cussed.  The definition should further include cyber attacks 
that result in massive property and data destruction in order to 
include attacks on a nation’s central infrastructure.  In sum, 
IHL regarding cyber attacks should give substantial considera-
tion to non-lethal consequences.   
IHL should also be expanded to specifically address cyber 
attacks against non-military objectives which would foreseea-
bly cause non-traditional results.  Specifically, Article 48 of 
Additional Protocol I provides: 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian popu-
lation and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all 
times distinguish between the civilian population and combat-
ants between civilian objects and military objectives and accord-
ingly shall direct their operations only against military objec-
tives.210  
Based on the language of Article 48, IHL would prohibit cyber 
attacks directed against non-military objectives that are in-
tended to, or would foreseeably, cause injury, death, destruc-
tion, or damage.211  However, an attack aimed against a non-
military objective that is not likely to result in these conse-
quences would be permissible.212  Therefore, an attack involv-
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ing a cyber attack on a nation’s power grid, banking or trading 
systems, or other aspects of infrastructure such as the DDoS 
attacks involved in the Estonia and Russian-Georgian conflicts 
would not be covered.  Nor would a virus initiated by a non-
state actor aimed at these locations be covered.  However, as 
noted earlier, these types of cyber attacks against non-military 
targets could have non-traditional destructive consequences213 
and should be accounted for in current IHL.  
The IHL principles regarding cyber attacks must also ad-
dress proportionality and unnecessary suffering outlined in 
Part IV.214  However, regarding proportionality, under current 
IHL, specifically Article 51(5)(b)215 of Additional Protocol I: 
It is difficult to evaluate whether an attack would be proportional 
according to the relevant categories of “loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,” 
as the typical direct effects of cyber attacks may be non-lethal or 
temporary, yet severe.216 
Consequently, the current language of proportionality needs to 
be changed in order to expressly give more weight to temporary 
or non-lethal consequences.217  For instance, regarding coun-
termeasures, if the United States were attacked by a virus that 
destroyed massive amounts of data, it would only be able to re-
spond with a similar cyber attack that would cause a propor-
tional amount of destruction; nothing more.  This proportional-
ity would also apply if a non-state actor was attacked by a state 
actor in a similar fashion. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Current international laws of war are inadequate, as they 
do not define or regulate many instances of cyber attacks.  
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They must be changed to include cyber attacks involving state 
and non-state actors.  A new frontier is before us.  Gone is the 
day when nation-states dominated international relations.  
Gone is the day when kinetic warfare was the only way to 
cause massive destruction.  Cyberspace is the new battlefield, 
state and non-state entities are the soldiers, and the weapons 
are computer-generated.  “The very technologies that empower 
us to lead and create also empower those who would disrupt 
and destroy.”218  Cyber attacks and cyber warfare are here to 
stay, and if the international community does not regulate this 
new style of combat, the consequences could be unfathomable.  
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